

Non-heterosexual Subjectivities and Subversions: the self-care and pleasure

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Received January 12, 2016; Accepted June 22, 2016

Abstract

This paper explores Michel Foucault's notion of "self-care" under two aspects. The first, as constructor of subjectivities and its relation to the notion of "technologies of the self". And the second, as a possibility of creation of the subject of himself through the use of pleasure. At the same time, it aims to outline how mechanisms of power are constituted in the non-heterosexual (and the emulation of heterosexual normativity) and to envisage an ethics that does not depend on the prevailing subjections, based on the idea of "life as Artistic creation".

Subjectivities, Pleasure, Ethics, Homosexuality

Citation: GARCÍA-CALDERÓN, Geronimo. Non-heterosexual Subjectivities and Subversions: the self-care and pleasure. ECORFAN Journal-Republic of Colombia 2016, 2-2: 40-51

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Introduction

The One of the last reflections that Michel Foucault approached before his death, turned on the constitution of the subjects in a particular time / space. This constitution, which Foucault defines as a "historical ontology", is a game of relations between to know, the power and the morality, where they emerge: subjects of knowledge, fastened that act on other subjects and ethical agents. Of these three "domains" the last one will take a major importance in the twilight of the thought foucaultiano¹

Since, precisely it is in the morality, where "they" "come together" and the domains "materialize" of to know and of the power. Foucault emphasized that it is, in this "relation with it itself that I consider to be moral and that determines how he must be constituted the individual in all that moral subject of his own actions²"

Although, the morality would have a double level in the construction of subjects. On the other hand, it would mark a relationship of the subject with himself by means of self-monitoring, an overconsciousness of himself and the constant review of his actions before the others. And for other one, of this relationship of self-government, would emerge the possibility of governing others (by learn a certain type of knowledge-power), a notion that Foucault would call "governmentality." And it is in sexuality where it would operate morality for the creation of subjects.

It is necessary to emphasize that the "homosexual subject" that emerges in the twentieth century is a subject marked mainly by a set of technologies of diverse nature and whose relational form, whether political, sexual or emotional is crossed by a certain knowledge-power hetero-Sexual.

Even more, the obligation of the heteronorma has particularly marked this homosexual subject, to the degree, which great of the "distinctive" of the homosexual (either in behavior or identity) is an emulation of the imperative of the heterosexual norm (the How it is understood, expresses and empowers such a standard).

On the other hand, one of the forms in which the power is incorporated in the subjects, appears as a device of knowledge and of power that, by means of diverse technologies, they are conforming both the standardization and the normalization in the social practices and especially, the subject himself in a seemingly private and individual praxis, as is sexuality.

In addition, as several authors³ have pointed out, this eminently heterosexual and compulsory enforcement device has been constituted under an idea of "naturalness". In this sense, the homosexual identity has operated under certain parameters of behavior and attitudes whose axis is heteronorma.

For example, if a man has relations with another man, he would automatically have to recognize himself as "homosexual" and adapt to the established parameters about what it is to be "homosexual" (and if it does not suit such a thing: or it feels "out of place" or feels rejected).

¹Which does not mean that there are "stages" in Foucault's thinking, but the reflection on the construction of Subjectivities was "shifting" towards the construction of the subject oh himself under various La tecnología del Yo. Such displacement is more clearly seen in the courses taught at the Collège de France between 1971 – 1984.

² Foucault, Michel. *La Inquietud por la Verdad: escritos sobre la sexualidad y el sujeto*. Siglo XXI, Avellaneda, 2013. p. 136.

³ For example, the idea of thre heterosexual sex-gender system of Gayle Rubin, the heteronorma de Monique Wittig or the obligatory heterosexuality of Adrienne Rich.

Thus, since the Heteronorma, a series of sexual identities have been created which, as "signatures", mark and impose a "unique" idea of sexual exercise. It is, from the lack/restriction where the subjects are known as objects of desire of the other.

These identities seek to homogenize the experience of human sexuality and if any subject is not "subjected" to such norms and ideas, then it is pointed to suffering both symbolic and physical violence.

On the other hand, for Foucault, the subject is not a transcendental entity outside the world, but this is a historical construction. It is to be emphasized that this construction arises from the formation of a knowledge prior to the subject, because the conceptualization of rational objects implies the emergence of a certain subject able to understand such object. For example, "The construction of the Madness object corresponded to that of a rational subject who had the pertinent knowledge about it and understood it"⁴. In addition, the subject makes sense to the extent that it is held by something.

These fastenings constitute their own ontological horizon: whether by knowledge, power or moral norms imposed, which would imply that not only is there a single restraint, but multiple fastenings: it is what Foucault called as Subjectivities.

Nevertheless, subjects tend to be subject to a single type of discourse, knowledge or moral looking in a single constituted identity. "It is not satisfactory to say that the subject is constituted in a symbolic system." It is constituted in historically analysable practices⁵. But what is the origin of the social practices that make possible the constitution of these subjectivities?

⁴ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, p. 50.

⁵ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, pp. 154 – 155.

The answer, we will find it in the notion of "technologies of the Self". These technologies:

Allow individuals to carry out, on their own or with the help of others, a number of operations on their body and soul, thoughts, conduct, or any form of being, thus obtaining a transformation of themselves in order to attain a certain state of Happiness, purity, wisdom or immortality.⁶

And it would be moral, the most powerful producer of subjectivities for the regulation and control of subjects, where they impose patterns of behavior in the subjects (called Morales) and that these, in addition, reproduce such norms as a result of the interiorization of them. In addition, the whole system of current social organization in the culture called Western becomes of "to be heterosexual" and to behave as such (in the way of dress, express oneself, to relate, etcetera), and in this way, will constitute a certain type of Subjectivities that respond (or react) to this heterosexual norm.

Technologies of the self as constructors of subjectivity

The conformation of moral subjects consists of three elements that relate to each other, but historically they are expressed and developed in different ways, namely; The desire, the restraint mode and the ascesis. It is important to point out that, for Foucault, desire has not changed in the West since antiquity because the vision of desire (and therefore morality) as monosexual⁷:

⁶ FOUCAULT, Michel. *Las Tecnologías del Yo*. Paidós, Barcelona, 1990. p. 49.

⁷ That is, it finds that there is only a sexuality exerted and regulated only for and by the males, since, the women from the Greek thought, do not possess own sexuality, but only exist as an extension of the sexuality of the male, being able to infer that that Sexuality is GARCÍA-CALDERÓN, Geronimo. Non-heterosexual Subjectivities and Subversions: the self-care and pleasure. ECFORFAN Journal-Republic of Colombia 2016

It is a moral of men: a Moral thought, written, taught by men and directed to men, obviously free. Virile morality, therefore, in which women only appear in the quality of objects or, at the most, of companions to which it is advisable to form, to educate and to supervise when one has them under their power, and of which, instead, we must abstain when they are under the power of another (father, husband, tutor)⁸

On the other hand, both the ascesis and the mode of restraint, would change according to the worldview of each epoch, demanding new patterns of behavior and imposing new forms of subject over time. Ascesis is an act in relation to the idea of desire or pleasure itself.

The mode of restraint "is the way or mode by which people are invited and encouraged to recognize their moral obligations"⁹. Thus, Ascesis is the way to act according to pleasure, and the mode of restraint, is the means of regulating the subject to the pleasure: it is as a prohibition, it is as a "conviction" that certain pleasurable practices (linked to the exercise of sexuality) are reprehensible or not.

In this way, I propose two ways in which the "technologies of the Self" mold the homosexual subject today: the subject from the "closet" (or heteronormado) and the figure of the gay (as Homonormado), but both figures depend on the heterosexual axis and the way in how they He has internalized or resisted (in an indirect dependency relationship) to heterosexual desire: Understood as a device that allows liberation, but at the same time oppression, of hegemonic ideology and operant in western thought and culture.

Homosexual Heteronormado is one who has internalized the patterns of behavior that imposes heterosexuality: condemns the effeminacy of homosexual males or the "masculiniamiento" of lesbian women; believes in "monogamy" as the only form of relationship between two homosexuals;

It punishes "ambiguous" forms in the expression of gender, such as "androgynous", transgender or transgendered; defend "socially accepted" values as the traditional family; reduces the sexual experience to roles fixed as "passive" and "active" and does not conceive how two people, can not have sex without the penetration is the "main act" in such exchange sexoafectivo.

On the other hand, it is very common this form of subjectivity between the homosexuals in western culture, since practically heterosexuality as a device, is usually the only form in the Constitution of homosexual subjects, since the knowledge, which constitutes Subjects are now heterosexual.

This, because the idea of gender tends to be mounted in a certain "naturalness" in the sexual division and with it, to think that there are only heterosexual subjects and whose practices, also they are.

Moreover, this knowledge established around sexuality and certain practices that the subject does in accordance with such knowledge, would create an identity to judge himself, where if what he does and knows about himself, is concordant¹⁰.

phallogentric and heterosexual, although Foucault does not expose it as.

⁸ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, 177.

⁹ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, 137.

¹⁰ As if, at the entrance, the subject could say who he is and what he wants clearly, expressing a truth.

For example, individuals are constantly required to "account" for their sexual behavior in relation to heterosexuality; Be it explicitly, as when you ask someone if you are gay or lesbian; So implicitly, as when you qualify for sexual exercise (outside the heterosexual standard¹¹) as something dirty, bad or identified as promiscuity.

In the background, subjects are expected to act and behave with regard to the ideas and speeches installed (understood as true) in the exercise of their sexuality. You would also be questioned whether your sexual practices correspond to the "socially established"¹² regarding a certain "sexual nature" and if this is ambiguous, you will be required to conform to the binary system, that is to say as your sex requires.

Respect to this last point, feminist authors such as Kate Millet, Gayle Rubin and later, Judith Butler, will realize that this montage, that is to say, this idea that there is a naturality in the division of the sexes and, therefore, of the genres and of the practices *Sexoafectivas*, it's fictional.

Since, while there is a certain "materiality" that has been devalued by the bodies, it does not imply that the relationship between the two genera is equally "natural". But what about those bodies where genitalia is ambiguous? Since it passes, that these individuals are usually corrected and should assign them a sex by then be treated as children (assigning at a time, a gender).

Let us first consider that sexual difference is often invoked as a matter of material differences. Nevertheless, sexual difference is never simply a function of material differences that are not in any way marked and shaped by discursive practices [...]The category of "sex" is, from the beginning, normative; it's what Foucault called a "regulatory ideal." [...] "sex" not only functions as a norm, but it is also part of a regulatory practice that produces the governing bodies, that is, whose regulatory strength is manifested as a kind of productive power, the power to produce-demarcate, circumscribe, Differentiating-the controlling bodies [...]In order to consolidate the heterosexual imperative.¹³

That is, heterosexual knowledge constructs bodies, mutilates genitals, or "reconstructs" the same. Since, that "naturalness" in the Bodies Frames performative Acts (act as "man" or "woman" according to their genitality), and when a creature is born, that same knowledge, determines material and discursively whether it will be male or female: there can be no individuals Sexually ambiguous.

Fortunately, it cannot be determined or detected if a child will be homosexual, because if so, there would be no doubt that medical and biological science would have already designed mechanisms for the "correction"¹⁴ of these individuals diverted in their (heterosexual) nature, Although there will be other forms of persuasion already being greater.

¹¹ Whether it be for non-reproductive, be it outside the relationship par excellence, the monogamy.

¹² Among the most important ideas and practices in relation to sexuality could be emphasized: sex is only for reproduction, desire is only heterosexual, sexual act is only through penetration, any other practice is seen as "unnatural", the Autoeroticism is accepted, but it is not recommended to spread it, talk about sex "will guide" individuals to perform it, therefore should not talk about

¹³ BUTLER, Judith. *Los Cuerpos que Importan: sobre los límites materiales y discursivos del "sexo"*. Paidós, Buenos Aires, 2002. pp. 17 – 18.

¹⁴ However, have existed in the medical history, treatments of various kinds for the correction of homosexuality, and although in most Western countries have been eliminated such practices, still persists among some psychological currents, Psychiatric and religious attempts to "change the deviant and unnatural nature" of homosexuals .

For his part, the homonormado his behavior will be guided by ideas he considers to be "own" of homosexuals. For example, consider that to be "truly homosexual" you need to know fashion, hate sports (and more if they are physical contact), have a certain sensitivity or creativity for ornament, have "good taste", be refined or emulate those Characteristics he considers important of his opposite sex.

There are some speeches that indicate that a transsexual, For example, to be "truly transsexual," I should have gone through the sex resignation operation, because, without this, it is not a transsexual "completely". In other words, homonormatividad is usually an ideal reconstruction of a certain "being homosexual", but on other occasions, it is a refined form of the heterosexual idea as opposed, it highlights the "best qualities" of the gender binary heterosexual. But, in both cases, there is a certain dependence on what heterosexuality points to as "must be". From there, that many effeminate men or male lesbian women, leading to the extreme expression of opposite sex, are thought as the archetypal models of homosexuality.

Nevertheless, it seems to me that, while the homonorma opens a certain field of possibility for empowerment, the questioning of social conventions or to satirize mechanisms and compulsory sexual and generic roles. I think, nevertheless, that it should be only one stage and that "one has to use sexuality to discover, invent new relationships." To be gay is to be in becoming¹⁵.

In other words, the Homonorma would set a certain homosexual identity (just as stiff as heterosexual) and it would be necessary, to use pleasure or desire as a mechanism of creation in relation to the body itself and the body of others.

Becoming homosexual, would imply "being doing" in the care of oneself and others: modify, change, accept that there is no such thing as an "identity" homosexual, transgender, bisexual, etcetera, but everything is a construct and historical becoming. And it would be, the notion of Foucault's self-care, a means to critically glimpse, a possible alternative to the creation of oneself as an ethical subject, without entirely giving up the creation of a certain "identity"¹⁶, but avoiding "fixating" on a single reality, and that would help the understanding of oneself and the other. So in the next section, I will delve into the notion of self-care and how it could help in creating oneself.

The care of the self as "creative act"

Could it be a form of self-Constitution of the subject that is outside the imposition of the "sexuality device" prevailing? To try to answer that question, I need to clarify what is the care of yes¹⁷ in Michel Foucault and present some brief reflections on how would place the non-heterosexual before the desire/pleasure, comparing between the forms of praxis ancient and contemporary. It is pertinent to remember, that ethics¹⁸ emerge in the act linked to pleasure or desire that a moral prescription has established, and that revising the act of the subject, this would be in the possibility of modifying them.

¹⁶ Nor hinted that should disappear the political identities as the collective LGBTQ nor that disappears the own identity, but that these identities of which I speak belong to another order, belong to the order of the same sense that the subject gives his life and to their sexual practices, although the political identities and individual are related.

¹⁷ Seen as the practice itself and not as the "builder" of the "I".

¹⁸ For Foucault ethics and morality are equivalent in some texts, in others there is a distinction; Morality is often seen as a social construct and ethics, oscillates between the actions of the subject towards his own desires and sometimes, in the questioning of his actions before the moral.

¹⁵ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, p. 112.

On the other hand, the Constitution of the contemporary subject becomes a "self-monitoring" that the subject performs to the internalize the moral standards. That is to say, to assimilate and implement those rules that a society has established as "good", "desirable" or even "natural", both on the pleasure and the desire without mediation or reflection some.

And although the notion of self care is a technology of the self, it opens a possibility that of this "restlessness" by oneself, can serve as a mechanism of creative construction of desire/pleasure, or at least, be the germ of resistance to morals (heterosexual) prevailing.

In the volumes of the "History of Sexuality:" The use of pleasures and the restlessness of oneself, "Michel Foucault describes that the practice on the care of oneself between Greeks and Romans has prevailed until today (modified in some respects) and that has little to do with the practiced in antiquity.

At present, when you think of "self care" it is more a matter that deals with the physical appearance, the so-called wellbeing (mental or physical) or the procuring of certain palliatives or exercises of the type of "perfect body worship, healthy or beautiful"¹⁹.

On the other hand, the old conceived the care of oneself in a deeper and more dynamic sense, where not only was it a simple "examination of conscience", but involving a double dimension. On the one hand, it was a constant reflection on pleasure and its interference not only in the life of each subject (as a ascetic exercise), but included a whole reflection on food, exercise, study, etc.

¹⁹ In other words, this "self care" is installed as a device of desire as a lack, the other becomes only an object that <contiene> to desire..

That is to say, it was a dietary of pleasure²⁰. And on the other, these reflections were about the scopes in social life that emerging in the relationship and interaction of both oneself and others, since the care of itself was "one of the main principles of the cities, one of the most important rules for the social behavior and staff and for the art of life"²¹.

Since govern self, he was in the capacity to govern the others. Thus, the care of Yes would have four general characteristics, namely: a) as a mode of the self facing the world, B) as reversal of the master's gaze (as look on the other) towards oneself²², c) as a transformation of oneself, and (d), as a "corpus" of reflections around care. Thus, the notion of self care in antiquity corresponded not only to a sexual praxis, but above all was a lifestyle, a commitment to itself. On the other hand, the self-care operated, along with the idea of "know Yourself", as a device that constituted a subjectivity different from the contemporary, because, who was constantly checking to know who it was and what it was doing, avoided the interiorization, and With it, passivity in the face of external discourses".

It is necessary to indicate that the Delphic mandate of the "Know Yourself" was subordinated to the notion of self care, that is, it was more important to revise, by means of regular and constant registration (as Praxis), what one did, and thus better understand the self-knowledge of one himself, and thereby, better elucidating the own desire/pleasure.

²⁰ In this diet of pleasure, Michel Foucault would recognize that it is an active way of constituting desire and pleasure. Since sexual pleasure is not isolated from other pleasurable forms, being the important practice itself..

²¹ Michel Foucault, *Las Tecnologías del Yo*, p. 51.

²² The master philosopher played a fundamental role in the care of himself, for he was the "most qualified" to guide in the constant process of this care, since the philosopher understood the complexity and depth of the "I" and the others.

From this restlessness of yes, they proliferated in the thought Greco-Roman various forms of ethical speeches (such as epicureísmo, stoicism or cynicism), but which had in common the constant review of oneself in the form of "restlessness" (of something that does not remain Still, nor is it stable). Thus, they operated (even now) several ethical speeches, without necessarily are a contradiction.

Nevertheless, as Foucault points out, in the course of time the importance of "know Yourself" was reversed on the "worry about yourself", and with that, the construction of the subject became more a "accountability" (in a convert what you want in a speech) than in a solicitation (and creation) of oneself. Foucault affirmed:

The «Know yourself» has darkened the «Worry about yourself», because our morality insists that what should be rejected is the subject ... In the Greco-Roman culture the knowledge of itself was presented as the consequence of the concern itself. In the modern world, knowledge of oneself constitutes the fundamental principle.²³

Thus, the importance in the contemporary thinking of "Know Yourself" is more than "vigilance" about the acts themselves in order to "tell the truth about oneself"²⁴.

This "truth" of oneself is, on the one hand, the internalization of the dominant morality and the obligatoriness of a single sexuality (which is heterosexual), and on the other, the use and sense that subject gives to the pleasure (or of how it is accessed) and its relation with the different speeches and N around sexuality (such as medical, psychological, punitive, etc.).

Foucault said: "An imperative was raised: not only confess the acts contrary to the law, but try to convert desire, all desire, in discourse"²⁵.

This turning all desire into discourse, is the negative form of the desire, desire as lack, homogenization of the experience and its expression. This imperative becomes accountable of the "desire" that remains hidden and veiled to the other, is to express by the confession something that no one else possesses and therefore becomes covetable and, at the same time, reprehensible; that releases, but oppresses at once.

Nevertheless, despite the existence of this imperative, the subject could establish a relationship with himself and know what forces, speeches or ideas constitute it in the present, and once being aware of this relationship, become an active subject, creator of their own rules, free of moral judgments imposed on him and the normatization. Foucault affirmed: "[with genealogy] I refer to analyzing the practices that pushed individuals to pay attention to themselves, to decipher themselves, to recognize themselves and to confess as subjects of desire"²⁶.

It would seem that by deciphering his practices, the non-heterosexual would be accepting that there is a truth that it sublies in it is being and has to be confessed as a desire. It should be clarified that, while accountability is for both heterosexuals and non-heterosexuals, the weight and the demand for the second with respect to their practices and "desires", it is major. In addition, this surrender of non-heterosexual desire sustains a subordinate relationship.

²³ Michel Foucault, *Las Tecnologías del Yo*, p. 55.

²⁴ Michel Foucault, *Las Tecnologías del Yo*, p. 46.

²⁵ FOUCAULT, Michel. *Historia de la Sexualidad I: la voluntad de saber*, Siglo XXI, México D.F., 2014. pp. 20 – 21.

²⁶ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, 161.

This accountability allows "to be possessed", to belong to the other, to categorize it and to delimit its actions, desires and practices. Nevertheless, we would have to "rebel" and "refuse" the forms and styles of life that the structures of power impose, through the different speeches around sexuality. That is, to convert the desire as creation/producer and to be active subjects of our forces and not simple "objects of the other". In this respect Judith Butler highlighted:

When we talk about my sexuality or my gender, as we do (and as we should) we want to say something complicated. Neither my sexuality nor my gender are precisely a possession, but both must be understood as ways of being possessed, way of being for another or, in fact, under another²⁷.

Subverting the Technology of heterosexual me

Precisely, the *technologies of the self* are the formations to capture the singularity of the subjects (and to some extent to return object to the other) by means of various mechanisms of subordination.

But, "there will always be a relationship with himself that resists codes and powers" [and] the relationship with oneself is one of the origins of those points of resistance²⁸.

Even more, "are we today able to have a morality of acts and pleasures that might take into account the pleasure of the other?" Is the pleasure of the other something that can be included in our pleasure, without reference to a law, marriage or I do not know what?²⁹

Knowing where and when to use pleasure makes us more free, but this choice must be based on a deep and constant reflection of our actions. The current error is to confuse the use of pleasure with hedonism, ie, to pursue pleasure for pleasure without measuring the possible scope or consequences of it. The slogan of today takes root in "cosificar" the desire and to see it like a cumulative good, producible, marketable.

The *self-care* should be a constant exercise and review of what we are and do and implies, a certain degree of autonomy, freedom and creation on the part of the subject. And to possess a degree of self-knowledge and the permanent care of both the body and the soul, the subject would be more "master of himself" and of their own pleasures. Foucault said:

Dealing with oneself is not simply a necessary condition for access to philosophical life, in the strict sense of the term ... this principle has become general terms in the basic principle of any rational behavior, in any way of active life that aspires to be governed by the principle of moral rationality³⁰

"Dealing with one himself" is a form of experience, of approaching our own being, through the transformation of our actions.

Foucault said: "The attitude of the individual about himself, the way he assures his own freedom from his desires, the form of sovereignty he exerts on himself are a constituent element of the happiness and good order of the city³¹". In other words, taking care of oneself is not about subtracting oneself and moving away from the other.

²⁷ BUTLER, Judith. *Deshacer el Género*. Paidós Studio, Barcelona, 2006. p. 38.

²⁸ DELEUZE, Gilles. *Foucault*, Paidós, Barcelona, 1987. p. 136.

²⁹ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, p.127.

³⁰ FOUCAULT, Michel. *La Hermenéutica del Sujeto*. Piqueta, Madrid, 1994. p. 34.

³¹ FOUCAULT, Michel. *Historia de la Sexualidad II: el uso de los placeres*. Siglo XXI, México, D.F., 2013). p. 88.

Nor is it an aesthetic care or "self-esteem", it is above all a vital attitude in the procuring of our own well-being in a rational way, to be aware of what we do and are, to leave the oppressive structures and assimilate us, to rethink the forms of relationship far from the conventionalities or social "tags".

It is, above all, an ethical exercise in a time/space of creation of our own individual self, of active and free subjects. It is, a call of responsibility of the subject with his own pleasures, trying to "deconstruct" what has been imposed. Bernini highlighted that:

The sexual freedom is not the recovery of the truth of a desire <<natural>> Since always present in all individuals of the human species, nor in the release of a multiplicity of desires that would constitute the truths that are specific to each, but the creative use that every human being can make the own body in search of pleasures <<artificial>> and therefore neither true nor false³².

That is to say, the use of pleasure would lead to a series of implications not only in the individual field, but would transcend the "public" space. Moreover, the forces that make up the subject become of a material reality, where the participation of the bodies and the sensations emanated from it, transcend the public space, and with that, it could be said that the use of pleasure is political³³.

In addition, Deleuze stresses that, in the thought of Foucault, these forces are expressed in a triple relationship:

Relationships formed, formalized in the strata (to know); The force relationships at the diagram level (power); And the relationship with the outside, that absolute relationship, as Blanchot says, which is also unrelated (thought). Does that mean it doesn't exist inside? [...]The outside is not a petrified boundary, but a changing matter animated of peristaltic movements, of folds and folding that constitute an inside: not anything but the outside, but exactly the inside of the outside³⁴.

So *pleasure* is the fold of external and internal forces that every individual experiences in his relationship with himself and with others. It is an exercise not only instinctive (as has been thought for a long time), but is a conscious (or unaware) positioning of the bodies, rationalizations and relationships that we hold with the other. Sexuality is not an intimate act, but it is the exposure of each subject's self to and with the other.

Moreover, it is an experience (and as such a transformer) that allows to know how the different subjectivities are constituted³⁵. Foucault affirmed:

To speak of sexuality as a singular historical experience also meant that instruments capable of analysing, in their own character and their correlations, could be available, the three axes that constitute it: the formation of the knowledge that refers to it, the Power systems that govern their practice and the ways in which individuals can and should be recognized as subjects of that sexuality³⁶.

³² BERNINI, Lorenzo. *Apocalipsis Queer: elementos de una teoría antisocial*. Egales, Madrid, 2015, p. 30. Las negritas son mías.

³³ Understood as a space of antagonistic forces in constant tension, transformation and modification, distinguishing itself from "the policy" that would be the institutionalization of those forces.

³⁴ Gilles Deleuze, *Foucault*, p. 128.

³⁵ It is necessary to remember that for Foucault there is no "transcendental subject" but changing forms of subjectivities that depend on the domains of knowledge, power and morality.

³⁶ Michel Foucault, *La Inquietud*, p. 160

Finally, Foucault would think that pleasure makes possible the transformation of the mechanisms of power, since, when the social practices are transformed, the devices should be modified around the sexuality. In other words, the notion of "self care" would allow the subject to know in his singularity and become an active subject in terms of the use of pleasure, creating a new form of subjectivation.

In this way, a new form of ethical exercise could be created not only by reaffirming itself as something that is not classifiable, but by creating pure strength. It would open a new path to strengthen the relationship of the subject with himself and the others, allowing a critique of the dominant system, becoming more plastic and accessible with which it is different.

The self-care, opens an ethical possibility of the subject before the speeches that are imposed to him, because what constitutes the subject are the social practices, but with a relevance in the sexual practices (because these practices place it in the axis of the moral), and sexual practices when operating under certain devices, are those that determine the horizon of meaning, called desire. Then, on having modified the practices, it might modify to the desire.

It is important to emphasize that Foucault avoided the term "desire" since, for him, desire (under the traditional context) often implies "lack of" and, on the contrary, Foucault would think that desire is "production of". This production is given under the notion of pleasure (and in turn, this one as praxis, which can be reproducible, modifiable and eliminated). Precisely a part of the so-called Queer theory, will retake the foucaultina idea of desire (understood as pleasure) to visible by means of praxis to non-heterosexual subjects, and from there, to fight for the recognition of other forms of desire.

Finally, the subject being active and conscious with his desire/pleasure and his practices, then he could constitute himself as a subject of desire, regardless of the speeches and devices turned and imposed from an "outside" (which was noted as fictional). That is why Foucault was interested in sadomasochistic practices, because in these practices he saw new ways of relation of the subject with the pleasures and of his practices, generating "different" subjects in relation with himself and with the others.

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