









Coalitions as a source of presidential power

Coaliciones como una fuente de poder presidencial

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Abstract









This article analyzes the electoral results of the two coalitions: "Sigamos Haciendo Historia" [Morena-PT-PVEM] and "Fuerza y Corazón por México" [PAN-PRI-PRD], which participated in the 2024 Mexican electoral process, and also shows their impact on presidential power. The main argument is that the coalition led by Morena was more effective, electorally speaking, which not only allowed it to remain in the country's presidency but also to obtain absolute majorities in the Legislative Power and in almost all Mexican states, winning governorships and gaining control of state congresses. These results show a return to political control, as in the past, of the president in Mexico, but not through a party, now through a coalition.

Resumen

El artículo contiene un análisis de los resultados electorales de las dos coaliciones: "Sigamos Haciendo Historia" [Morena-PT-PVEM] y "Fuerza y Corazón por México" [PAN-PRI-PRD], que estuvieron en el proceso electoral de 2024 en México, además de mostrar las repercusiones de estos en el poder presidencial. El argumento principal es que la coalición liderada por Morena fue más efectiva, electoralmente hablando, que no sólo le permitió continuar en la presidencia del país, sino además obtener las mayorías absolutas en el Poder Legislativo y en casi todos los estados de la República mexicana, ganando las gubernaturas y consiguiendo el control de los congresos estatales. Estos resultados muestran un regreso del control político, como en el pasado, del presidente [a] en México, pero ya no por un partido, sino por una coalición.

Coalitions as a Source of Presidential Power		
Objectives	Methodology	Contribution
Determine the relevance of political party coalitions for winning elections in Mexico. 	Descriptive methodology. 	Advocacy and attention to national problems. 
Analyze the 2024 electoral results in Mexico. 	Analysis of electoral results. 	Contribution to existing theories on party coalitions and presidentialism. 
Observe the existence of Mexican presidentialism based on the 2024 elections 	Analysis of legislation related to electoral matters. 	Generation of potential new lines of research. 

Morena, AMLO, Coalitions, Presidentialism.

Coaliciones como una fuente de poder presidencial		
Objetivos	Metodología	Contribución
Determinar la relevancia de las coaliciones de partidos políticos para ganar elecciones en México. 	Metodología descriptiva. 	Defensa y atención de problemas nacionales. 
Analizar los resultados electorales de 2024 en México 	Análisis de resultados electorales. 	Contribución a teorías existentes de coaliciones de partidos y presidencialismo. 
Observar la existencia del presidencialismo mexicano a partir de las elecciones de 2024. 	Análisis de legislación en materia electoral. 	Generación de posibles nuevas líneas de investigación. 

Morena, AMLO, Coaliciones, Presidencialismo.

Area: Advocacy and attention to the national problems

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Introduction

This article aims to highlight how coalitions in Mexico have been strengthening in recent years. However, since 2018, they have been formed not only to win elections but also to gain control of both federal and local legislative power. In this regard, Andrés Manuel López Obrador recognised the importance of these coalitions in 2006 in order to become president of the republic, subsequently to gain control of the legislature and, finally, to achieve victory in most of the states of the republic. As a result, the Morena political party and its allies won the presidency in the 2018 elections. In the 2021 midterm elections, Andrés Manuel managed to maintain a relative majority in both chambers, and it was not until 2024 that he achieved, through the coalition he led, an absolute majority in the Legislative Branch and in local legislatures, which are necessary to carry out constitutional reforms.

In Mexico, coalitions have not been widely studied. However, due to the electoral reforms that have taken place, mainly since 1988, it was thought that it would not be possible for the president to regain control of the federal and local legislative branches, in addition to the governorships.

However, Andrés Manuel López Obrador saw that this power could be regained, but no longer through a party but through a coalition. He therefore promoted an electoral coalition, which in 2018 enabled him to win the elections and obtain a simple majority in the federal legislature, as well as some governorships and municipalities throughout the country.

However, it is not until the 2024 elections that this coalition manages to win not only the presidency but also an absolute majority in the federal legislature, most local legislatures, governorships in Mexico, and municipal presidencies.

One issue that will generate further research in the future is that the ‘Sigamos Haciendo Historia’ coalition, led by Andrés Manuel in 2024, will no longer be just an electoral coalition but also a legislative one, both at the federal and local levels. With this practice, presidentialism in this country will not only be revived but also strengthened.

The research question for this paper is: in which electoral spaces was the ‘Sigamos Haciendo Historia’ coalition more effective than ‘Fuerza y Corazón por México’ during the 2024 elections, and to what extent could these results strengthen the power of the presidential figure in Mexico? To this end, the hypothesis that guides this work is: Although the ‘Sigamos Haciendo Historia’ coalition did not consolidate its position in all federal, state and municipal spaces, it did achieve high effectiveness in those where it competed, obtaining an absolute majority in the federal Congress, in local congresses and in numerous municipal presidencies.

These results mark the return of presidential control in Mexico, no longer through a political party, but through a coalition of parties.

The overall objective is to demonstrate the effectiveness of the ‘Sigamos Haciendo Historia’ coalition in the 2024 elections against the opposition ‘Fuerza y Corazón por México’ coalition.

To this end, we propose the following specific objectives: a) to analyse the federal election results of the two electoral coalitions; b) to ascertain the state election results of the two electoral coalitions; c) to study the municipal election results of the two electoral coalitions; d) to analyse the political control that the president has regained in Mexico.

The methodology used for this research is descriptive, based on the election results of the two coalitions observed at the federal level in the 2024 presidential, Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections, as well as their counterparts at the local level in gubernatorial, local congress and municipal presidential elections: ‘Let’s Keep Making History’ of the National Regeneration Movement [Morena], Labour Party [PT] and Green Ecologist Party of Mexico [PVEM], and ‘Strength and Heart for Mexico’ of the National Action Party [PAN], Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] and Party of the Democratic Revolution [PRD].

To this end, a review was conducted of all the agreements of the two coalitions mentioned in the election for the presidency of the republic, 300 deputies and 64 senators by relative majority at the federal level and 9 governorships, 31 local congresses and 1,802 municipal presidencies, showing their distribution by federal entity, classified into formulas for the case of the Senate of the Republic, electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies, local districts for state congresses and the number of municipalities to be elected according to each entity, generating a database with all the electoral successes of the two coalitions at the federal, state and local levels.

In turn, an analysis of national electoral legislation is carried out, namely the General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures [LGIPE] and the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States [CPEUM], in order to determine how the results obtained at the federal and state levels have led to an increase in the power of the president, based on the main theories of study of party coalitions and presidentialism in the Mexican case.

To develop this proposal, the article consists of a brief state of the art on previous work on coalitions in Mexico; their importance in the 2018 and 2021 elections; and, finally, the 2024 electoral process, which will be divided into the results of the ‘Sigamos Haciendo Historia’ and ‘Fuerza y Corazón por México’ coalitions in the presidential and gubernatorial elections, followed by the federal legislative elections and, finally, the state and municipal congresses.

Studies of coalitions in Mexico

The study of coalitions in Mexico is a topic that has been gaining relevance, with various authors contributing to the debate.

Méndez [2012] makes an initial distinction between the types of political party coalitions, both governmental and electoral, the latter being the most prevalent in Mexico, whose main objective is to win elections. The author highlights the little attention that had been paid to this electoral phenomenon until then [pp. 148-150].

Another study that provides an overview of the future of coalitions is that of Paoli Bolio [2012], The author assesses the relative strength of parties in federal elections between 1988 and 2012, mentioning the importance of coalitions in a competitive system in which political parties in Mexico, individually, are proving insufficient to win elections. In addition to the ideological weakening of these parties, he points to the pragmatism of these political institutions. Bolio [2012] makes it clear that the turning point where the importance of coalitions in winning elections in Mexico can be seen is from 1988 onwards.

For Méndez [2012], the 2000 election is another turning point in understanding the importance of coalitions in a competitive system, as it was from this date onwards that political alternation was achieved. It should be remembered that the ‘Alliance for Change’ coalition formed by the PAN and the PVEM gave victory to Vicente Fox, ending more than 70 years of PRI hegemony [Méndez, 2012, p. 152]. In this election, the PRI ran alone, as did the DS, PCD and PARM parties, and the opposition coalition ‘Alianza por México’ [PRD, PT, Convergencia, PAS and PSN] had no strength or electoral success. It is important to note that, unlike other elections, the ‘Alliance for Change’ coalition won, among other reasons, because Vicente Fox promoted the so-called ‘useful vote’, i.e. voting for political change rather than for the strength of the coalition.

Reynoso and Espinoza [2017] point out that when there is greater party fragmentation and a smaller margin of victory in previous elections, coalitions are likely to form, which will reduce the number of candidates. In addition to the above, Hernández and Mares [2020] point out that, in a highly competitive electoral landscape, it is advantageous for candidates to have greater public resources for their political campaigns. In this case, in the Mexican legislature, it is noted that when these institutions form coalitions, they can draw on the resources of each of their members, which can lead them to structure broader campaigns that allow them to win in a competitive electoral system. In addition to the above, these authors mention that when these electoral figures take shape, their members also gain access to radio and television airtime, which gives them the opportunity to run a more homogeneous campaign at the national level in these media spaces [2020, p. 36].

The study of coalitions in the Mexican context is also mentioned by Cruz and Devoto [2019], who agree that coalitions appear when there is high electoral competition [p. 280]. The importance of their research lies in the study of coalitions not only at the national level but also at the subnational level [p. 290]. This issue is important for this article because, although alliances and/or coalitions in Mexico initially had the main objective of winning seats at the federal level, coalitions now also seek seats at the state and municipal levels.

As we can see, the authors cited above agree [Méndez, 2012; Bolio, 2012; Hernández and Mares, 2020], first, that the 1988 elections marked the beginning of coalitions with the emergence of the National Democratic Front [FDN]. Secondly, that coalitions in a competitive party system lead to greater chances of electoral success. Thirdly, this electoral model allows for greater public resources and more space on state-regulated radio and television; these elements are fundamental, not only in competitive elections but also when it is necessary to win more electoral seats, such as in the federal legislature. This point is important to note, as it must be remembered that one of the sources of Mexican presidentialism is unified government[1].

Results of the 2018 and 2021 elections

Hernández and Mares [2020, 2022] point out that Andrés Manuel López Obrador realised, while he was in the PRD, the importance of coalitions in winning presidential elections; for this reason, he always ran for office through this electoral mechanism: 2006 'Coalition for the Good of All' [PRD, PT, Convergencia]; 2012 'Progressive Movement' [PRD, PT, MC]; and 2018 'Together We Will Make History' [Morena, PT, PES].

It should be noted that, in this last election, López Obrador succeeded, unlike in previous elections, in ensuring that the coalition he led was legally established throughout the country, which, among other factors, led him to the presidency: "Morena's political achievement... was to formulate more homogeneous scenarios at the national level with great effectiveness, as there were few places where the coalition with its strategic allies PT and PES failed to materialise" [Hernández and Mares, 2020, p. 45].

It should also be remembered that, in this election, this leader promoted voting not only for the president but also for the legislature, as he was clear that, in order to fulfil his campaign commitments, the president had to have control of the legislative branch. However, he did not obtain an absolute majority, only a relative one, which would prevent him from carrying out constitutional reforms.

In this context, Andrés Manuel faced the challenge of winning more seats in the federal legislature in the 2021 midterm elections in order to obtain an absolute majority. To this end, he formed the 'Together We Make History' coalition, which now includes the PVEM, PT and Morena [the PES lost its registration in 2018]. It should be noted that these parties do not have polarised ideologies[2], and Andrés Manuel's leadership has earned the trust of the electorate, something that was not seen with the opposition coalition, which brought together three ideologically distant parties: the PAN, PRI and PRD:

...this coalition does have serious ideological differences, as the PAN is right-wing, the PRD has left-wing origins and the PRI, although centrist, is burdened by corruption and mistrust among the population due to its many years in government. However, due to electoral competitiveness, these parties decided to form a coalition to win federal seats, despite their ideological and electoral differences... [Bolívar, 2022, p. 92].

In 2021, the 'Juntos Hacemos Historia' coalition failed to win a majority of federal electoral districts, and although it was the most effective of the two coalitions [Hernández and Mares, 2022], it did not obtain enough seats to secure an absolute majority in the legislature. In fact, its results were lower than in the previous election. In contrast, the 'Va por México' coalition [PAN, PRI and PRD], although it did win more legislative seats than in 2018, was unable to consolidate its position in most electoral districts, nor did it win in all the districts where it ran:

Of the 300 federal districts, the Va por México coalition [PAN, PRD, PRI] won in a greater number of districts [219], unlike the Juntos Hacemos Historia coalition [Morena, PT, PVEM], which only won 182 districts.

However, the latter was more successful, winning 119 of the districts in which it ran, i.e., it won in 65% of the districts where it participated, while the Va por México coalition won in 219 districts and only triumphed in 65, in other words, only 30% of its candidates were successful. These results can be analysed in two ways: despite not winning their coalition districts, the PRD, PAN and PRI did achieve better results than in 2018... [Hernández and Mares, 2022, p. 248].

Despite these results, Morena and its allies managed to retain a relative majority in the Federal Chamber of Deputies, and if we add the legislators from the 'Juntos Hacemos Historia' [Together We Make History] coalition [PT, PVEM, Morena], the president won 278 seats, representing 55.6% of the seats [see Table 3]. The same was true in the Senate, where Morena had 59 seats, PT 6 and PVEM 7, for a total of 72 seats, which is still less than in 2018, since it must be taken into account that the senators who entered through the PES in 2018 were counted as without a party because the latter lost its registration. However, even adding these seats, Andrés Manuel did not achieve a qualified majority in this chamber [see Table 4].

Although they did not manage to increase their seats in the federal congress, Morena and its coalition won the election in 11 more states: Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Colima, Guerrero, Michoacán, Nayarit, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tlaxcala and Zacatecas, to which we can add San Luis Potosí, where the PVEM and PT coalition [Morena's allies in both the elections and the legislature] won the governorship. It should be remembered that in 2018, Andrés Manuel began his term with five states: Mexico City, Chiapas, Tabasco, Veracruz and Morelos [in coalition with the Social Encounter Party, which nominated the candidate, and the Social Democratic Party of Morelos], while in Puebla, with the death of Martha Érika Alonso, the PAN governor elected in 2018, special elections were called in 2019 and Morena won, thus adding six governorships. In other words, by 2021, Andrés Manuel and his coalition governed 18 of 32 states.

As can be seen, in the 2021 midterm elections, Morena and its allies failed to gain more seats in the Legislative Branch, which will therefore become one of the priorities for the 2024 election: to obtain an absolute majority.

Despite these results, it should be noted that the 'Juntos Hacemos Historia' [Together We Make History] coalition [Morena, PT, PVEM] was more effective than the opposition, which, despite being present in more districts, did not achieve the expected electoral success.

It should be noted that the Morena, PT, PVEM coalition has proven since 2018 to be more effective than its counterpart, a trend that will continue in the 2024 presidential election.

The achievements of the 2024 federal elections

1. Presidential and gubernatorial results

First, the presidential results were overwhelming, with the 'Sigamos Haciendo Historia' coalition winning 59.76% of the vote against 27.45% for the 'Fuerza y Corazón por México' coalition, which came in second [see Table 1].

[1] Jeffrey Weldon [2002] points out the importance of a unified government, requiring that one party control the presidency and both houses of Congress, since otherwise party discipline and the president's leadership over his party are weakened, and no president can force compliance from a chamber controlled by a party other than his own [Weldon, 2002: 177].

[2] Ideological distance [Sartori, 1980: 159]. For more information, see <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2024/03/04/coalicion-fuerza-corazon-por-mexico-ideologia-historia-orix>.

Box 1

Table 1

Election results of the presidential elections in 2024.

Coalitions [parties]	Candidates	Electoral percentage
Strength and Heart for Mexico [PAN-PRI-PRD]	Bertha Xochitl Galvez Ruiz	27.45%
Let's Keep Making History [Morena-PT-PVEM]	Claudia Sheinbaum Pardo	59.76%
Citizens' Movement	Jorge Álvarez Maynez	10.32%

Source: own elaboration. National Electoral Institute.

Of the candidates for 9 governorships, the coalition led by Andrés Manuel won again in Chiapas, Mexico City, Morelos, Puebla, Tabasco and Veracruz, won for the first time in Yucatán and lost only in Jalisco [Movimiento Ciudadano] and Guanajuato [Fuerza y Corazón por México] [see table 2].

Box 2

Table 2

Gubernatorial elections, 2024

State	Winning Formula
Chiapas	"Let's Continue Making History in Chiapas" Morena-PT-PVEM-PESC-RSP-PCU-PMC-FMC-PPCH
Mexico City	"Let's Continue Making History in Mexico City" Morena-PT-PVEM
Guanajuato	"Strength and Heart for Guanajuato".PAN-PRI-PRD
Jalisco	Citizens' Movement
Morelos	"Let's Continue Making History in Morelos" Morena-PT-PVEM-NAM-PESM-MAS
Puebla	"Let's Keep Making History in Puebla". Morena-PT-PVEM-NAP-FxMP
Tabasco	"Let's Keep Making History in Tabasco".Morena-PT-PVEM
Veracruz	"Let's Keep Making History in Veracruz". Morena-PT-PVEM-FxMV
Yucatán	"Let's Keep Making History" Morena-PT-PVEM

Source: Own elaboration based on official counts of the Local Public Electoral Bodies. [OPLES].

With these results Morena and its allies in 2024 went on to govern 24 of 32 states in the country: Mexico City, Baja California, Baja California Sur, Campeche, Chiapas, Colima, Guerrero, Hidalgo, State of Mexico, Michoacán, Morelos, Nayarit, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas, Tlaxcala, Veracruz, Yucatán, Zacatecas and San Luis Potosí [PVEM-PT].

2. Election results for seats in the Legislative branch of government

In the case of the legislative branch elections, both coalitions were present in a greater number of federal districts; however, the coalition with the greatest success was "Sigamos Haciendo Historia", which only lost the districts of Aguascalientes, and where it tied the number of winning districts with the opposition coalition "Fuerza y corazón por México" was in Nuevo León and Querétaro; in all other states it won the majority of districts.

As can be seen in Table 1 [see Annex], when Morena considered it could win alone, it did not seek the coalition, as in the case of Baja California where it won in 8 districts, as well as 2 in Chiapas, 6 in Hidalgo, 1 in Jalisco, 6 in the State of Mexico, 1 in Michoacán, 3 in Oaxaca, 1 in Quintana Roo, 2 in Sinaloa, 6 in Tabasco and 1 in Veracruz, in all of them Morena had electoral success.

Thus, Morena and its allies won 256 of 300 deputies of relative majority, and if we add to these the deputies of proportional representation, this coalition won 364 deputies, far surpassing the 333 deputies necessary for the qualified majority, which points to the strength of the coalition in the elections of 2024, compared to those of 2018 and 2021 [see table 3].

Box 3

Table 3

Composition of the Chamber of Deputies 2018-2024

P. Político	2018	2021	2024
Morena	191	198	236
PT	61	37	51
PES	56	N/A	N/A
PVEM	16	43	77
PRI	45	70	35
PAN	81	114	72
PRD	21	15	1
MC	27	23	27
PANAL	2	N/A	N/A
Independiente	0	0	1
Total	500	500	500

Note: The number shows the composition of the Chamber of Deputies at the beginning of the legislature.

Source: Prepared by the authors. National Electoral Institute.

For the seats in the Senate, the coalition "Sigamos Haciendo Historia" was also successful, as can be seen in the following table, where the majority of the formulas were won by this coalition. Again, as in the Chamber of Deputies, when Morena thought it could win without a coalition, it did so alone, as can be seen in the cases of Baja California, Chiapas, Guerrero, Hidalgo, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, Tabasco, Tamaulipas and Tlaxcala, winning 20 senators out of a possible 24, while the coalition won 38 senators out of 40 [see Annex, table 2].

In the Senate, the coalition "Sigamos Hacemos Historia" won 83 seats [Morena 60, PT 9, PVEM 14], just three senators short of a qualified majority; however, Morena sought two votes from PRD deputies and one from the PAN to achieve it, thus obtaining the necessary votes to approve one of the most publicised reforms of Andrés Manuel's presidential term: the reform of the judiciary. This clearly shows Andrés Manuel's political ability to achieve a unified government and the party discipline of both Morena and its allies [PT and PVEM].

It is worth noting that Morena's senators did not increase significantly in the 2024 election, but rather those of the PT and PVEM, mainly the latter party, which, as the table shows, went from 7 to 14 senators, which again shows the importance of the coalition.

Box 4

Table 4

Composition of the Senate of the Republic 2018-2024

P. Político	2018	2021	2024
Morena	55	59	60
PT	6	6	9
PES	8	N/A	N/A
PVEM	7	7	14
PRI	13	13	16
PAN	23	18	22
PRD	8	3	2
MC	7	12	5
SP	1	10	0
Total	128	128	128

Note: The number shows the composition of the Senate at the beginning of the legislature.

Source: own elaboration. National Electoral Institute Table 4

With these election results, President Andrés Manuel López Obrador leaves his successor, Claudia Sheinbaum, with an absolute majority in the Chamber of Deputies, with 364 legislators, a number that would give the government the unified power necessary to achieve any constitutional change, as well as in the Senate, in addition to electoral success in 24 of 32 states. These results show a return to the presidential control of the past [Carpizo, 1978; Weldon, 2002], but no longer based on a single party, but now on a coalition.

As a sign of the president's political power, before the end of his presidential term, Andrés Manuel achieved constitutional reform to transform the judiciary [1]. This reform had been proposed since the beginning of the six-year term, but the number of seats in the legislature did not allow for its approval [2]. The last time a reform of this magnitude had been carried out was in 1994, when the PRI still maintained absolute hegemony in the legislature.

This reform marks a return to party discipline in the legislature vis-à-vis the president, as in the era of the hegemonic party, but now not only among the deputies of the president's party, but also among those who make up the coalition. This explains why it was essential for Andrés Manuel to achieve electoral success in the federal districts. It should be remembered that the current electoral law no longer allows a single party to have more than 300 deputies under both principles, and that each political party separately cannot have a number of deputies under both principles that represents a percentage in the chamber that exceeds by more than eight points its percentage of the vote [Article 54, sections IV and V of the Constitution and Article 15, paragraph 3 of the General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures][3]. With this new legislation, Andrés Manuel worked hard to form a coalition at the national level, as this would not only give him more public resources and more media space for the national campaign, but was also the only way to obtain a qualified majority in the Legislative Branch.

3. 2024 state and municipal elections: success and political control.

This section will analyse the results of both coalitions to see whether 'Let's Keep Making History' was more effective in the state and municipal election results than the 'Strength and Heart for Mexico' coalition.

A] 'Let's Keep Making History' coalition.

The Morena party and the parties that make up the coalition not only won the majority of governorships, but also gained control of the state congresses, which is necessary for constitutional reforms, since, as stated in Article 135[4] of the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States, at least 17 of the 32 are required to approve reform proposals.

In this regard, as shown in Table 3 [see Annex], for local deputies, the 'Let's Keep Making History' coalition won two coalitions, three flexible coalitions, 17 partial coalitions and four common candidacies.

Looking at the results column, we see that the majority were won, and in states such as Baja California, Baja California Sur, Colima, Hidalgo, Oaxaca and Quintana Roo, all the candidates nominated were successful. These data show the electoral victory of the Morena-PT-PVEM coalition, as they won 21 local congresses in the country, meeting the number required for the approval of constitutional reforms.

In the case of municipal coalitions, this coalition won 0 total coalitions, 5 flexible coalitions, 12 partial coalitions and 2 common candidacies throughout the country. As can be seen, this level was not as consistent, and only in Quintana Roo and Zacatecas did the coalition win in all categories, while in some cases it fell well short of the required number of nominations, as was the case in Jalisco, Morelos, Nuevo León and Guerrero. Despite this, the coalition won 445 of the 579 municipalities in which it competed, which shows that, at the municipal level, the 'Sigamos Haciendo Historia' coalition was also very effective, electorally speaking [see Annex, Table 3].

However, it should be noted that on this occasion, the 'Sigamos Haciendo Historia' coalition was very clear that it had to win the districts necessary to gain control of the federal congress, as well as a majority of the states, in order to have the legal conditions to carry out constitutional reforms, a goal that was achieved. Although the coalition was not as careful at the municipal level as it was at the federal level, 'Sigamos Haciendo Historia' still achieved greater success than the opposition coalition, as will be seen below.

B] 'Fuerza y Corazón por México' coalition.

In the case of the 'Fuerza y Corazón por México' coalition, it did not achieve the expected success for various reasons. First, it was not homogeneous throughout the country, as there were states such as Guanajuato where the coalition was not formed, and in others, it disintegrated, as was the case in Coahuila, among other factors, due to a scandal over the distribution of candidacies [5].

We can also mention Yucatán, where the coalition did not consolidate due to a lack of internal agreements.[6]

Secondly, the coalition presented a real ideological challenge, as the three parties that made it up had historically competed against each other and were characterised by their ideological differences [the PRD on the left, the PRI in the centre and the PAN on the right], meaning that the coalition lacked its own identity. The only objective that united them was to snatch electoral success from Morena, especially in the Chamber of Deputies.

Thirdly, Xóchilt Gálvez's presidential candidacy for this coalition did not succeed in uniting the three parties, due not only to the incompatibility of ideologies, but also to Xóchilt's weak leadership in establishing a single agenda. In fact, during the election campaign, there were constant confrontations between the different agendas of the leaders of each of the parties that made up this coalition. With these strategic and ideological problems, the 'Fuerza y Corazón por México' coalition in the local congressional elections achieved only 10 total coalitions, 1 flexible, 13 partial and 5 joint candidacies. Furthermore, the level of effectiveness is low, as we can see in the results column of Table 4, where there are few successes. In fact, after the 2024 election, this coalition only controls four local congresses: Aguascalientes, Chihuahua and Nuevo León, with Aguascalientes being the only state where this coalition won all the districts where it ran. On the other hand, there are states where it did not win any seats, such as Baja California Sur, Oaxaca, Puebla, Quintana Roo, Sinaloa and Tlaxcala.

At the municipal level, the 'Corazón por México' coalition won a total of six coalitions, three flexible, 12 partial and 12 common candidacies, again with little effectiveness, since, if we look at the results column, there are once again states where it did not win any seats, such as Campeche, Quintana Roo and Tabasco. This resulted in only 299 of the 918 municipalities in which it competed, and as Table 4 shows, there are states where it did not win a single municipality: Campeche, Quintana Roo and Tabasco. In other words, these data show that this coalition was present in more municipalities than the 'Sigamos Haciendo Historia' coalition, but as in previous cases, it proved to be largely unsuccessful [see Annex, Table 4].

All of the above allows us to see how Andrés Manuel López Obrador managed to see the importance of coalitions in guaranteeing not only the presidency of the Republic, but also governorships, local legislatures and municipalities, thus obtaining political control very similar to the past when the PRI ruled as the hegemonic party. Therefore, the study of coalitions today is no longer just about winning elections, but about regaining the power of the president in Mexico.

Methodology

The methodology used for this research is descriptive, based on the election results of the two coalitions observed at the federal level in the 2024 presidential, Chamber of Deputies and Senate elections, as well as their counterparts at the local level in elections for governors, local congresses and municipal presidencies:

‘Let's Keep Making History’ by the National Regeneration Movement [Morena], the Labour Party [PT] and the Green Ecologist Party of Mexico [PVEM], and ‘Strength and Heart for Mexico’ by the National Action Party [PAN], the Institutional Revolutionary Party [PRI] and the Party of the Democratic Revolution [PRD].

To this end, a review was conducted of all the agreements of the two coalitions mentioned in the election for the presidency of the republic, 300 deputies and 64 senators by relative majority at the federal level and 9 governorships, 31 local congresses and 1,802 municipal presidencies, showing their distribution by federal entity, classified into formulas for the case of the Senate of the Republic, electoral districts for the Chamber of Deputies, local districts for state congresses and the number of municipalities to be elected according to each entity, generating a database with all the electoral successes of the two coalitions at the federal, state and local levels.

In turn, an analysis of national electoral legislation is carried out, namely the General Law on Electoral Institutions and Procedures [LGIPE] and the Political Constitution of the United Mexican States [CPEUM], in order to determine how the results obtained at the federal and state levels have led to an increase in the power of the president, based on the main theories of study of party coalitions and presidentialism in the Mexican case.

Results

Studies of coalitions in Mexico

As we can see, the authors cited in this section show, first, that the 1988 elections marked the beginning of electoral coalitions with the emergence of the National Democratic Front [FDN]. Second, that coalitions in a competitive party system lead to greater chances of electoral success. Thirdly, this electoral phenomenon allows for greater public resources and more space on state-regulated radio and television; these elements are fundamental, not only in competitive elections but also when it is necessary to win more electoral space, as is the case with the federal legislature. This point is important to note, as it must be remembered that one of the sources of Mexican presidentialism is unified government.

Results of the 2018 and 2021 elections

It should be remembered that in 2018, Andrés Manuel began his term with five states, and in 2019, another state was added, in addition to obtaining a simple majority in the Federal Congress. By 2021, Andrés Manuel and his coalition governed 18 of 32 states. However, Morena and its allies failed to gain more seats in the Legislative Branch, which will become one of the priorities for the 2024 election: obtaining an absolute majority. It should be noted that the coalitions led by Morena have proven since 2018 to be more effective at the polls than their counterparts, a trend that will continue in the 2024 presidential election.

The achievements of the 2024 federal elections.

However, by 2024, Morena and its allies manage to strengthen the coalition at the national level and with great effectiveness, finally obtaining a qualified majority in the Legislative Branch with 364 deputies and 83 senators, in addition to governing 24 of 32 states and controlling 21 local legislatures and 444 municipalities in the country. On the other hand, the opposition coalition ‘Fuerza y Corazón por México’ [Strength and Heart for Mexico], despite winning more districts at the federal level and for the Senate, as well as at the state and municipal levels than the winning coalition, did not achieve the expected results, obtaining only 39 deputies, 4 senators and 1 governorship, in addition to obtaining a majority in only 4 local congresses and 299 municipalities.

Therefore, forming a broader coalition across the country does not guarantee electoral success.

With these results, it is clear that Morena's coalition today serves to give one party total control of the country, despite electoral reforms made in 1996, which sought to prevent any party from having majority political power.

However, Andrés Manuel López Obrador realised that through a united and disciplined coalition, he could gain the support that the PRI had during its years as the hegemonic party, thereby strengthening presidential power, an issue that opens the door to future research.

Conclusions

This research shows that the coalition led by Andrés Manuel López Obrador, which began in 2006, achieved one of its greatest successes in 2018 by winning the presidency of the republic. Although it won a relative majority in the legislature, this was not enough to make changes to the constitution, and it only won five governorships.

For the 2021 election, Andrés Manuel reformed the coalition and was only able to maintain a relative majority in the federal legislature, although he did win more states, gaining control of 18, including those previously won.

However, by 2024, Morena and its allies managed to strengthen the coalition at the national level and, with great effectiveness, finally obtained a qualified majority in the Legislative Branch with 364 deputies and 83 senators, in addition to governing 24 of 32 states and controlling 21 local legislatures and 444 municipalities in the country.

On the other hand, the opposition coalition 'Fuerza y Corazón por México' [Strength and Heart for Mexico], despite winning more districts at the federal level and for the Senate, as well as at the state and municipal levels than the winning coalition, did not achieve the expected results, obtaining only 39 deputies, 4 senators and 1 governorship, in addition to obtaining a majority in only 4 local congresses and 299 municipalities. Therefore, forming a broader coalition across the country does not guarantee electoral success.

With these results, it is clear that Morena's coalition today serves to give one party total control of the country, despite electoral reforms made in 1996, which sought to prevent any party from having majority political power.

However, Andrés Manuel López Obrador realised that through a united and disciplined coalition, he could gain the support that the PRI had during its years as the hegemonic party, thereby strengthening presidential power, an issue that opens the door to future investigations.

[7] Among the changes that the judiciary would undergo are: reducing the number of ministers of the SCJN from 11 to 9 and their term of office from 15 to 12 years; eliminating the lifetime pension for current and future ministers of the SCJN, in addition to adjusting their remuneration to the maximum limit established for the president of the republic; the Judicial Disciplinary Tribunal would be created to replace the Federal Judiciary Council; the ministers of the Supreme Court of Justice, magistrates of the Federal Electoral Tribunal and magistrates of the Disciplinary Tribunal would be elected nationally in ordinary elections from a list of 30 candidates proposed by the three branches of government, with the executive branch proposing up to 10 candidates; the legislative branch will propose up to five candidates per chamber of deputies and chamber of senators by a qualified majority; the judicial branch will propose up to ten candidates through the plenary session of the Supreme Court of Justice by a majority of six votes; in the case of the 1,633 circuit magistrates and district judges, they shall be elected in each of the 32 judicial circuits in ordinary elections from 6 equal nominations per position, 2 for each branch of government.

Annexes

Box 5

Table 5

Coalition agreements and election results of the 2024 Federal Deputies elections.

Coalition agreements					Election results									
Federal Districts Deputation		Agreements reached			Winning coalition		Elected formula							
State	Total de distritos	"Si gamos Hacien do Historia"	"V a por Mé xico"	"Si gamos Hacien do Historia"	"V a por Mé xico"	MC	MORENA	PT	PVEM	PAN	PRI	PRD	INDEPENDIENTE	
Aguascalientes	3	3	2	0	2	0	0	0	0	1	0	0	0	
Baja California	9	1	9	1	0	0	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Baja California Sur	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Campeche	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Coahuila	8	8	8	5	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Colima	2	2	2	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Chiapas	13	11	13	11	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Chihuahua	9	9	9	5	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Ciudad de México	22	22	22	18	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Durango	4	4	4	3	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Guajuato	15	15	12	8	5	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	
Guerrero	8	8	8	8	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Hidalgo	7	1	7	1	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Jalisco	20	18	20	14	4	1	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Estado de México	40	34	38	33	1	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Michoacán	11	10	11	8	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	1	
Morelos	5	5	5	5	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nayarit	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Nuevo León	14	14	14	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Oaxaca	10	7	10	7	0	0	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Puebla	16	16	16	16	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Queretaro	6	3	6	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Quintana Roo	4	3	4	3	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
San Luis Potosí	7	7	7	6	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Sinaloa	7	5	7	5	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Sonora	7	7	7	7	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tabasco	6	0	6	0	0	0	6	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tamaulipas	8	8	8	7	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Tlaxcala	3	3	3	3	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Veracruz	19	18	19	17	1	0	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Yucatán	6	6	6	5	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Zacatecas	4	4	4	4	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	
Totales	300	260	294	219	39	1	37	0	0	3	0	0	1	

Source: Prepared by the authors based on official tallies of the National Electoral Institute and coalition agreements of the political parties.

Box 6

Table 6

Coalition agreements and electoral results of the 2024 Senate elections.

Coalition agreements					Election results									
Senators		Agreements reached			Winning coalition		Elected formula							
State	Formulas	"Let's Keep Making History"	"Going for Mexico".	"Let's Keep Making History"	"Going for Mexico".	MC	MORENA	PT	PVEM	PAN	PRI	PRD		
Aguascalientes	2	2 [Morena - PAN]	2 [PAN - PAN]	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Baja California	2	N/A	2 [PAN - PRI]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Baja California Sur	2	2 [PT - Morena]	2 [PAN - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Campeche	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PRI - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Coahuila	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PRI - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Colima	2	2 [PVEM - PT]	2 [PRI - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Chiapas	2	N/A	2 [PRD - PRI]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Chihuahua	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PAN - PAN]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Ciudad de México	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PRI - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Durango	2	2 [PT - Morena]	2 [PAN - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Guanajuato	2	2 [Morena - PVEM]	N/A	1	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Guerrero	2	N/A	2 [PRI - PRD]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Hidalgo	2	N/A	2 [PRI - PRD]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Jalisco	2	2 [Morena - PVEM]	2 [PAN - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Estado de México	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PAN - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Michoacán	2	2 [PT - Morena]	2 [PRD - PAN]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Morelos	2	2 [Morena - PVEM]	2 [PRI - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Nayarit	2	2 [PVEM - Morena]	2 [PAN - PRI]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Nuevo León	2	2 [PVEM - PT]	2 [PAN - PAN]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Oaxaca	2	N/A	N/A	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Puebla	2	2 [Morena - PT]	2 [PRI - PAN]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Queretaro	2	N/A	2 [PAN - PAN]	0	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Quintana Roo	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PAN - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
San Luis Potosí	2	N/A	2 [PAN - PRI]	0	0	0	0	0	2	0	0	0		
Sinaloa	2	N/A	2 [PRI - PAN]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Sonora	2	N/A	2 [PRI - PAN]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Tabasco	2	N/A	2 [PRD - PRI]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Tamaulipas	2	N/A	2 [PAN - PRI]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Tlaxcala	2	N/A	2 [PRI - PRD]	0	0	0	2	0	0	0	0	0		
Veracruz	2	2 [Morena - PT]	2 [PAN - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Yucatán	2	2 [Morena - PVEM]	2 [PRI - PAN]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Zacatecas	2	2 [Morena - Morena]	2 [PRI - PRD]	2	0	0	0	0	0	0	0	0		
Totales	64	40	60	38	4	0	20	0	2	0	0	0		

Source: Prepared by the authors based on official tallies of the National Electoral Institute and coalition agreements of the political parties.

Box 7

Table 7

Coalition agreements and electoral results of "Let's Make History" at local level in the 2024 elections.

States	LOCAL DEPUTIES		TOWN HALLS	
	Agreements reached	Results	Agreements reached	Results
Aguascalientes	THERE WAS NO COALITION		NO HUBO THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Baja California	FLEXIBLE 8/17 Morena-PVEM-FxMBC	8/8	FLEXIBLE 3/7 Morena-PVEM-FxMBC	3/3
Baja California Sur	JOINT CANDIDACY 16/16 Morena-PT-PVEM-NA	16/16	JOINT CANDIDACY 5/5 Morena-PT-PVEM-NA	4/5
Campeche	PARTIAL 20/21 Morena-PT-PVEM	13/20	PARTIAL 12/13 Morena-PT-PVEM	8/12
Coahuila	THERE WAS NO ELECTION		PARTIAL 33/38 Morena-PT	
Colima	PARTIAL 14/16 Morena-PT-PVEM	14/14	PARTIAL 9/10 Morena-PT-PVEM	5/9
Chiapas	PARTIAL 22/24 Morena-PT-PVEM-RSP- PCHU-PMCH-PES- FxM-PPCH	18/22	PARTIAL 6/124 Morena-PT-PVEM- RSP-PCHU-PMCH- PES-FxM-PPCH	4/6
Chihuahua	FLEXIBLE 12/22 Morena-PT	8/12	FLEXIBLE 36/67 Morena-PT	21/36
Ciudad de México	PARTIAL 29/33 Morena-PT-PVEM	27/29	PARTIAL 15/16 Morena-PT-PVEM	11/15
Durango	PARTIAL 9/15 Morena-PVEM	8/9	THERE WAS NO ELECTION	
Guanajuato	PARTIAL 11/22 Morena-PT-PVEM	8/11	THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Guerrero	PARCIAL 24/28 Morena-PT-PVEM CANDIDATURE COMMUNE 2/28 Morena-PT-PVEM	23/26	PARTIAL 43/85 Morena-PT- PVEM	21/43
Hidalgo	JOINT CANDIDACY 18/18 Morena-PANALH	18/18	JOINT CANDIDACY 84/84 Morena- PANALH	71/84
Jalisco	TOTAL 20/20 Morena- PT-PVEM-HAG-FUT	13/20	PARTIAL 92/125 Morena-PT-PVEM- HAG-FUT	30/92
Estado de México	PARTIAL 32/45 Morena-PT-PVEM JOINT CANDIDACY 9/45 Morena-PT-PVEM	40/41	PARTIAL 73/125 Morena-PT- PVEM	51/73
Michoacán	PARTIAL 23/24 Morena-PT-PVEM	21/23	PARTIAL 78/112 Morena-PT- PVEM	50/78
Morelos	FLEXIBLE 4/12 Morena-PANAL- PES-MAS	2/4	FLEXIBLE 11/36 Morena-PANAL- PES-MAS	3/11
Nuevo León	PARTIAL 14/26 Morena-PVEM	5/14	PARTIAL 28/51 Morena-PVEM	11/28
Oaxaca	PARTIAL 21/25 Morena-PVEM-FxM	21/21	JOINT CANDIDACIES *	
Puebla	TOTAL 26/26 Morena- PT-PVEM-FxM- PANAL	26/26	JOINT CANDIDACIES *	
Querétaro	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Quintana Roo	PARTIAL 14/15 Morena-PT-PVEM	14/14	PARTIAL 10/11 Morena-PT- PVEM	10/10
San Luis Potosí	PARTIAL 14/15 Morena-PT-PVEM	13/14	PARTIAL 41/58 Morena-PT- PVEM	35/41
Sinaloa	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Sonora	PARTIAL 20/21 Morena-PT-PVEM	16/20	JOINT CANDIDACY 63/72 Morena-PT- PVEM	36/63
Tabasco	JOINT CANDIDACY 5/21 Morena-PVEM	5/5	JOINT CANDIDACY 4/17 Morena-PVEM	¼
Tamaulipas	PARTIAL 21/22 Morena-PT-PVEM	21/21	PARTIAL 41/43 Morena-PT- PVEM	27/41
Tlaxcala	COMMUNAL CANDIDACY 11/15 Morena-PVEM- PANAL-FxM-RSP	11/11	THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Veracruz	PARTIAL 28/30 Morena-PT-PVEM	28/28	THERE WAS NO ELECTION	
Yucatán	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Zacatecas	PARTIAL 14/18 Morena-PVEM	11/14	FLEXIBLE 18/58 Morena-PVEM	18/18

*Candidacies from Oaxaca and Puebla were very diverse

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official tallies of the Local Public Electoral Bodies. [OPLES]

Box 8

Table 8

Coalition agreements and electoral results of "Fuerza y Corazón por México" at the local level in the 2024 elections.

States	LOCAL DEPUTIES		TOWN HALLS	
	Agreements reached	Results	Agreements reached	Results
Aguascalientes	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Baja California	FLEXIBLE 8/17 Morena-PVEM- FxMBC	8/8	FLEXIBLE 3/7 Morena-PVEM- FxMBC	3/3
Baja California Sur	JOINT CANDIDACY 16/16 Morena-PT- PVEM-NA	16/16	JOINT CANDIDACY 5/5 Morena-PT- PVEM-NA	4/5
Campeche	PARTIAL 20/21 Morena-PT-PVEM	13/20	PARTIAL 12/13 Morena-PT-PVEM	8/12
Coahuila	THERE WAS NO ELECTION		PARTIAL 33/38 Morena-PT	
Colima	PARCIAL 14/16 Morena-PT-PVEM	14/14	PARCIAL 9/10 Morena-PT-PVEM	5/9
Chiapas	PARTIAL 22/24 Morena-PT-PVEM- RSP-PCHU-PMCH- PES-FxM-PPCH	18/22	FLEXIBLE 6/124 Morena-PT-PVEM- RSP-PCHU-PMCH- PES-FxM-PPCH	4/6
Chihuahua	FLEXIBLE 12/22 Morena-PT	8/12	FLEXIBLE 36/67 Morena-PT	21/36
Ciudad de México	PARTIAL 29/33 Morena-PT- PVEM	27/29	PARTIAL 15/16 Morena-PT- PVEM	11/15
Durango	PARTIAL 9/15 Morena- PVEM	8/9	THERE WAS NO ELECTION	
Guanajuato	PARTIAL 11/22 Morena-PT- PVEM	8/11	THERE WAS NO ELECTION	
Guerrero	PARCIAL 24/28 Morena-PT- PVEM JOINT CANDIDACY 2/28 Morena-PT-PVEM	23/26	PARTIAL 43/85 Morena-PT- PVEM	21/43
Hidalgo	JOINT CANDIDACY 18/18 Morena- PANALH	18/18	JOINT CANDIDACY 84/84 Morena- PANALH	71/84
Jalisco	TOTAL 20/20 Morena- PT-PVEM-HAG-FUT	13/20	PARCIAL 92/125 Morena-PT-PVEM- HAG-FUT	30/92
Estado de México	PARTIAL 32/45 Morena-PT- PVEM CANDIDATURA COMÚN 9/45 Morena-PT-PVEM	40/41	PARTIAL 73/125 Morena-PT- PVEM	51/73
Michoacán	PARTIAL 23/24 Morena-PT- PVEM	21/23	PARTIAL 78/112 Morena-PT- PVEM	50/78
Morelos	FLEXIBLE 4/12 Morena-PANAL- PES-MAS	2/4	FLEXIBLE 11/36 Morena-PANAL- PES-MAS	3/11
Nuevo León	PARTIAL 14/26 Morena-PVEM	5/14	PARTIAL 28/51 Morena-PVEM	11/28
Oaxaca	PARTIAL 21/25 Morena-PVEM-FxM	21/21	JOINT CANDIDACIES*.	
Puebla	TOTAL 26/26 Morena- PT-PVEM-FxM- PANAL	26/26	JOINT CANDIDACIES*.	
Querétaro	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Quintana Roo	PARTIAL 14/15 Morena-PT- PVEM	14/14	PARTIAL 10/11 Morena-PT- PVEM	10/10
San Luis Potosí	PARTIAL 14/15 Morena-PT- PVEM	13/14	PARTIAL 41/58 Morena-PT- PVEM	35/41
Sinaloa	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Sonora	PARTIAL 20/21 Morena-PT- PVEM	16/20	JOINT CANDIDACY 63/72 Morena-PT- PVEM	36/63
Tabasco	JOINT CANDIDACY 5/21 Morena-PVEM	5/5	JOINT CANDIDACY 4/17 Morena-PVEM	¼
Tamaulipas	PARTIAL 21/22 Morena-PT- PVEM	21/21	PARTIAL 41/43 Morena-PT- PVEM	27/41
Tlaxcala	COMMUNAL CANDIDACY 11/15 Morena-PVEM- PANAL-FxM-RSP	11/11	THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Veracruz	PARTIAL 28/30 Morena-PT- PVEM	28/28	THERE WAS NO ELECTION	
Yucatán	THERE WAS NO COALITION		THERE WAS NO COALITION	
Zacatecas	PARTIAL 14/18 Morena-PVEM	11/14	FLEXIBLE 18/58 Morena-PVEM	18/18

*Candidacies from Oaxaca and Puebla were very diverse

Source: Prepared by the authors on the basis of official tallies of the Local Public Electoral Bodies. [OPLES].

Declarations**Conflict of interest**

The authors declare that they have no financial or personal conflicts of interest that could have unduly influenced the preparation of this article.

Contributions of the authors

Hernández-García, Ma. Aidé: Her contribution includes the initial conceptualisation of the article, supervision of the research process, analysis and interpretation of the data, and organisation and writing of the manuscript.

Torres-Palacios, Juan José: He collaborated in the collection and systematisation of data, the construction of databases and the preparation of tables, as well as supporting the data analysis process.

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Abbreviations

PRI – Institutional Revolutionary Party
 PAN – National Action Party
 PRD – Party of the Democratic Revolution
 PVEM – Green Ecologist Party of Mexico
 Panal – New Alliance Party
 MC – Citizen Movement
 Morena – National Regeneration Movement
 PT – Labour Party
 PES – Social Encounter Party
 PARM – Authentic Party of the Mexican Revolution
 PAS – Social Alliance Party
 PSN – Nationalist Society Party
 Convergence – Convergence for Democracy
 DS – Social Democracy

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PCD – Democratic Centre Party

References**Background**

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